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Abstract
Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability?
We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes, using nationally
representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are
associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that
mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do and do not enforce
noncompetes. Decomposing mobility into job offer generation and acceptance, we
detect no evidence of differences in job search, recruitment, or offer activity associated
with noncompetes. Rather, we find that employees with noncompetes—even in states
that do not enforce them—frequently point to their noncompete as an important reason
for declining offers from competitors. Our data further show that these employees’
beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit or legal enforcement are important predictors
of their citing a noncompete as a factor in their decision to decline competitor offers.
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1. Introduction
The economic usefulness of contracting is predicated on the idea that when disputes arise
courts will enforce valid agreements to hold parties to their promises. If one party breaches or
threatens to breach a valid contract, other parties can bring a lawsuit to collect appropriate damages
or compel performance—and will do so if litigation is likely to result in enforcement and is not
overly costly. The predictability of contract law and the availability of courts make promises costly
to break, which in turn allows parties to depend on and invest in reliance upon these promises. An
unstated corollary of this understanding is that invalid or unenforceable contractual provisions are of
little economic value to either party because such agreements will have few if any effects on
behavior. If an agreement cannot be enforced, parties will only comply with it if doing so is in their
individual best interest at the time—but we usually assume that economic actors pursue their best
interests absent any contractual requirement. An important further implication of this corollary is that
unenforceable contracts should be rare or nonexistent in the real world.
Recent research, however, shows that this latter implication is not true—unenforceable
contracts appear to be common in practice, reflecting a surprising decoupling of the use of
contractual provisions and whether those provisions are legally enforceable. For example, as many as
73% of rental leases contain unenforceable clauses (Furth-Matzkin 2017), and employers regularly
ask employees to sign noncompetes in states that will not enforce them (Starr et al. forthcoming,
Bishara et al. 2015, Sanga 2018). The widespread use of unenforceable contract terms appears to
challenge the longstanding presumption that a contract’s enforceability is crucial to its ability to
influence a party’s behavior. But while scholars have reported the systematic use of unenforceable
provisions, raised ethical concerns about their application (Kuklin 1988, Sullivan 2009), and
hypothesized about their likely behavioral consequences (Blake 1960), we know very little about
whether unenforceable contractual terms produce changes in real world behavior. An important
question, therefore, is whether contracts matter independent of the law governing their enforceability.
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An affirmative answer to this question would raise many new questions about the economic
motivations for contracting and about how best to regulate the contracting process and substantive
contract language to prevent potential abuse and manipulation.
We investigate this question in the context of employment-related covenants not to compete
(“noncompetes), which prohibit employees from joining or starting competing enterprises within
geographic and temporal limits. The noncompete context is appealing from a research perspective for
several reasons: First, there is significant variation in the legal enforceability of noncompetes across
U.S. states. Some states will not enforce them at all and others enforce them vigorously (Bishara
2011). Second, the intuition that noncompetes in particular might matter independent of their legal
enforceability dates back to at least Blake (1960), who wrote:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an
in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations and on
competitors who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or who are
anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their competitors. Thus, the mobility of
untold numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose
severity no court would sanction.
An in terrorem effect occurs when individuals “voluntarily” adhere to contractual or statutory
language in anticipation of legal consequences (e.g., a lawsuit) were they to choose not to comply. In
theory, such an effect may result even with respect to illegal or unenforceable contract terms. In such
cases, adherence might arise from, for example, inaccurate beliefs about the content of the law (Fisk
2002, Arnow-Richman 2006) or simply the financial and professional costs of responding to a
frivolous lawsuit (Sullivan 2009). Yet we are aware of no empirical evidence of in terrorem effects
resulting from unenforceable agreements, particularly in the employment contracting environment.1
In fact, evidence to date on the important behavioral consequences of noncompetes derives almost
entirely from enforcement-related policy differences across states and over time (Marx et al. 2009,

For example, Arnow-Richman (2006) notes that “the effect of noncompete agreements on worker perceptions
and behavior is an under-explored empirical question” (p. 966).
1
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Garmaise 2009, Starr et al. 2018) and not from the use of noncompetes themselves. Existing research
leveraging differences in state law (without data on contract use) simply cannot address whether
noncompetes matter independent of the law (Bishara and Starr 2016).
To assess the extent to which noncompetes matter for employee mobility independent of the
law and to provide direct evidence on the existence and scope of any in terrorem effects, we use data
on 11,505 labor force participants and their experiences with noncompetes to analyze how
noncompetes influence the rate and direction of employee mobility, along with its constituent
subprocesses (e.g., search, recruitment, job offer receipt, and job offer acceptance). As a baseline, we
first establish that individuals with noncompetes have, on average, a 17% higher competitor-specific
reservation wage, 11% longer tenures, and a 54% greater likelihood of reporting that they will leave
for a noncompetitor relative to a competitor compared to an observationally equivalent employee not
subject to a noncompete. While we caution against a causal interpretation of our baseline mobility
results because our analysis does not exploit any purely exogenous variation in the use of
noncompetes, our estimates are robust to an extensive set of controls that include, among other novel
variables, various restrictive covenants (e.g., nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, etc.) and employer-level
poaching flows. We also use a within-individual differencing strategy to mitigate selection on
employee- or employer-level unobservables, and diagnostic tests indicate that any selection on
unobservables would need to be implausibly severe to overturn the relationships we identify (Oster
2017). Finally, direct survey evidence also supports the causal role of noncompetes for a significant
share of our sample.2
We next address our primary research question: whether the employee mobility patterns
associated with noncompetes depend on noncompete enforceability. Importantly, we find that the
2

Among those who have entered into a noncompete in the past, 33% report that a noncompete has materially
influenced a past mobility decision, with the two most common reported effects being delay in leaving the employer
(11.6%) and departure from the industry entirely (12%).
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relationship between noncompetes and mobility holds even in states where noncompetes are
unenforceable. In fact, we discern no statistical differences in our baseline mobility patterns between
states where noncompetes are enforceable and states where they are not.
To investigate the mechanisms underlying our mobility results and to explore how contracts
might operate independent of law, we adopt a search and matching perspective in which employee
mobility is contingent on the resolution of two subprocesses: (1) the acquisition of a job offer
through recruitment by or search for an alternative employer, and (2) the employee’s determination
whether to accept that job offer. We detect no evidence that employees with noncompetes receive
less recruitment attention or fewer job offers from competitors, but we do find that employees with
noncompetes are recruited by and search for jobs at noncompetitors more frequently than competitors
relative to individuals not bound by noncompetes. Tellingly, these results on mobility subprocesses
are largely statistically indistinguishable across states with higher and lower levels of noncompete
enforceability, with the exception that employees who sign noncompetes in high-enforceability states
appear to be relatively more likely to report receiving job offers in the last year from
noncompetitors—a finding that suggests employers may be more informed than employees about the
law surrounding noncompetes.
The fact that employees with noncompetes do not search less, do not attract less recruitment
attention, and do not receive fewer job offers seems inconsistent with our evidence that these same
individuals have longer tenures—until one recalls that people can decline offers of employment.
Approximately 40% of respondents bound by noncompetes—in both enforcing and nonenforcing
states—report that a noncompete has been a factor in their declining a job offer from a competitor.
We explore why this might be so, and we find that respondent beliefs about the likelihood of court
enforcement of a noncompete and the likelihood of their employer suing them over their
noncompete, as well as reminders about the existence of their noncompete by their employer,
strongly predict whether individuals will cite their noncompete as influencing their reaction to an
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offer from a competitor. In contrast, we find no indication that the enforceability of noncompetes
deters employees from accepting such offers. To our knowledge, our results constitute the first
rigorous evidence of the in terrorem effect of noncompetition agreements.
The central contribution of this study is to highlight and unpack the possibility that even
unenforceable contractual provisions may influence behavior. In the context of noncompetes, our
analysis complements the existing literature on mobility, which focuses almost entirely on the role of
the state-level enforceability of noncompetes, by stressing the important possibility that the existence
of a noncompete itself can be critical to how long employees stay at their jobs and where they go
when they leave, whether or not the noncompete is enforceable.
One important policy implication of our results derives from our evidence that noncompetebound employees appear to refuse job offers due to their beliefs about the likelihood of a resulting
lawsuit and about court enforcement—as opposed to whether a court would actually enforce their
noncompete. This finding implies that some employers may use noncompetes even when they are
fully aware that such provisions are unenforceable, cognizant of the fact that employee beliefs may
be inaccurate and open to manipulation, for example, by reminding employees of their
(unenforceable) noncompetes or by visibly pursuing frivolous litigation against former employees
(Ganco et al. 2015). Thus, policymakers wishing to reduce mobility barriers should consider enacting
laws that limit the use of noncompetes—perhaps by increasing the cost of using clearly
unenforceable provisions—as opposed to supporting reform proposals that restrict noncompete
enforceability in court, as they now tend to do. Furthermore, given that employee beliefs appear to
play such an important role and that many noncompetes are actually unenforceable, future research
should examine whether employee beliefs are unfounded and whether disabusing employees of any
mistaken beliefs might encourage them to accept attractive offers from competitors.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we outline our conceptual
framework, detail the specific facets of the mobility process, and relate our research to prior
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scholarship on noncompetes, mobility, and in terrorem effects. In Section 3, we briefly describe our
data and data preparation work. In Section 4, we explain our empirical strategy, report our results,
investigate the robustness of our findings, and explore the mechanisms underpinning the patterns we
observe. We discuss and conclude in Section 5.
2. Conceptual Framework and Prior Scholarship
In this section, we integrate the idea that noncompetes typically influence employee mobility
choices via an in terrorem channel—i.e., employees comply with a noncompete because they
anticipate legal consequences if they breach it, not because a court has already ordered them to
comply with the agreement—with a canonical search and matching view of the labor market. We use
this combination to understand whether and how noncompetes may differ in their mobility effects
based on the enforceability of such provisions. Assuming endogenous search and recruitment effort
(Burdett and Mortensen 1998, Manning 2003, Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002), we posit that employee
mobility is contingent on the resolution of two subprocesses: First, through on-the-job search by the
employee or employer recruitment (i.e., identifying and developing potential candidates, including
those not presently engaged in on-the-job search), another employer must make an employment
offer. Second, the offer’s terms must reach some reservation threshold (wages, benefits, etc.) for the
employee to accept it.
By definition, noncompetes that employees believe can be legally enforced will impose
moving costs on any bound individual, and these costs will raise their competitor-specific reservation
threshold, all else equal. If an employee with a noncompete receives an offer from a competitor that
is below the individual’s (higher) reservation threshold but above their counterfactual (lower)
reservation threshold (i.e., if they were not bound by a noncompete), then the employee will turn
down an offer they otherwise would have accepted. Fewer accepted offers produce lower mobility
levels. Alternatively, if competing employers can discern which employees are bound by
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noncompetes, and the net return of attempting to hire someone who is or is more likely to be bound
by a noncompete is lower than recruiting an individual who is less likely to be bound by a
noncompete, these employers should make fewer offers to individuals bound by noncompetes
(sometimes simply to avoid anticipated rejection), also resulting in less employee mobility.
Noncompetes only raise the costs of moving to “competitors,” however, and therefore the
mobility effects of noncompetes will be attenuated when employees can more easily search for
employment opportunities with noncompetitors and when employers can freely recruit people in
noncompeting industries. In an extreme situation, when noncompetitors and competitors are perfectly
interchangeable as employers, noncompete-based moving costs should have no effect on overall
mobility—though we would still expect employees bound by noncompetes to be more likely than
other employees to move to noncompetitors. By contrast, if employment offers from noncompetitors
are less forthcoming or those offers often propose something below an employee’s reservation
threshold—perhaps because noncompetitors are unwilling to pay for an employee’s industry-specific
human capital (Parent 2000)—we should observe negative mobility effects.
All of these predictions are based on the notion that noncompetes are legally enforceable.
After all, it is the threat of the employer enforcing the contract in court that forces employees to
internalize the costs of any breach (typically, in the form of an injunction against working for the
poaching competitor along with the possibility of money damages). However, in the U.S.,
noncompete enforceability varies dramatically across states, with California and North Dakota courts
refusing to enforce them at all in the context of job-to-job moves, while other states enforce
noncompetes even when the employee is involuntarily terminated (Bishara 2011). Add to this fact the
recent and unexpected empirical finding that noncompetes are at best only slightly less common in
states that refuse to enforce noncompetes relative to states that enforce them vigorously (Bishara et
al. 2015; Starr et al. forthcoming), and it seems vital to examine whether the mere existence of a
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noncompete—whether it is enforceable or not—may play an important role in explaining employee
mobility patterns.
A few recent studies notwithstanding (Gurun et al. 2019, Carlino 2017), research generally
indicates that mobility rates are somewhat lower in states where noncompetes are more rather than
less enforceable in court (Fallick et al. 2006, Marx et al. 2009, Garmaise 2009, Balasubramanian et
al. 2020). However, because they lack data on who is actually “bound” by a noncompete, these
studies do not and cannot show that any effects of noncompete enforceability are driven by the
behavior of employees actually subject to noncompete provisions, although this is an understandable
way to interpret their findings. This implicit inference is in line with the canonical view: unless a
noncompete is enforceable, it will necessarily have limited behavioral implications for the mobility
choices employees make, and we can assume these away. Yet these studies cannot explain why
noncompetes usage is so prominent in states that do not enforce them, and, perhaps more important,
they cannot address the potentially distinctive effects that noncompetes might have themselves,
independent of the law. One interesting implication of this logic is that existing state law-based
studies may actually understate the combined effects of noncompete use and enforceability as
opposed to the effects of enforceability alone (given noncompete prevalence).
In contrast, some legal scholars have long assumed that even unenforceable contracts can
produce important behavioral changes in parties—i.e., even invalid or unenforceable contracts can
have in terrorem or chilling effects on employee mobility (Blake 1960, Fisk 2002, Arnow-Richman
2006). With respect to noncompetes, one commonsense basis for this conjecture is employee “fear”
of a (possibly noncredible) lawsuit, perhaps attributable to employees being uninformed about the
law (Fisk 2002).3 Sullivan (2009) expands on this point by arguing that employees may also be

3
Merriam Webster defines in terrorem as “by way of threat or intimidation: serving or intended to threaten or
intimidate.” Coincidentally, the example given by Merriam Webster for using the phrase in terrorem is “overbroad
covenants not to compete which have in terrorem effect on employees.”
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“unwilling to risk the resources needed to establish [a noncompete’s] invalidity” even when they are
well informed. Employees may know the law, be confident about how the law ought to apply to their
noncompete, and yet still abide by the provision’s terms to avoid the potential financial and
opportunity costs of a protracted legal battle that they cannot afford or may (erroneously) lose
(Arnow-Richman 2006). 4 Such costs may also be moral or reputational, if the employee feels bound
to keep their “promise” not to compete or if they are worried about developing a reputation as being
disloyal in their chosen industry or profession. Taken together, this alternative view suggests that the
costs of even frivolous enforcement litigation and erroneous employee beliefs about the law and the
likelihood of a lawsuit may virtually eliminate the practical importance of the actual enforceability of
noncompetes as it relates to mobility choices. 5
3. Data: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project
We analyze nationally representative employee-level data from a large online panel of
verified U.S. labor force participants. The data include extensive information on employee
experiences with and beliefs about noncompetes along with detailed information about their current
and past employment as well as relevant demographic information. The sample population are
individuals aged 18 to 75 who are either employed in the private sector or in a public healthcare
system or who are unemployed. The final sample comprises 11,505 respondents drawn from all
states, industries, occupations, and other demographic categories. We briefly discuss key elements of
the data in what follows. We offer more details in our appendix and an even more extensive

4
A few legal scholars suggest that these rationales may lead employers to use the threat of noncompete
litigation coercively (Bishara and Westerman-Behaylo 2012).
5
A natural response to these arguments is to question why employees remain uninformed about the law if
competitors interested in poaching them are legally sophisticated and well-informed about the enforceability of
noncompetes. One might reasonably hypothesize that if competitors are informed as to enforceability, and can
communicate what they know about noncompete-related enforcement to the people they recruit, we might observe
mobility patterns in the receipt of offers and, particularly, in how employees respond to those offers (i.e., following
contact with a competitor) that differ from mobility patterns in employee search behavior and exploratory recruiting
activity (i.e., prior to employee contact with the competitor in question).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 11
examination in Prescott et al. (2016), which is a technical paper that describes the collection,
cleaning, and validation processes, an investigation into sample-selection issues, and our handcoding of occupations and industries, weighting methods, and imputation procedures.
Due to the potential for noncompliance among online survey takers, we carefully cleaned our
raw data before arriving at our final sample. These steps included identifying and removing repeat
survey attempts (both within and across IP addresses), reviewing all free-form responses to questions
to exclude respondents who were intentionally noncompliant, and dropping individuals who failed to
pass attention filters (among other exhaustive measures—see the data appendix for more details). We
used a flagging algorithm to identify up to 21 different possible inconsistencies or errors within an
individual’s set of survey responses, including, for example, whether respondents report their
establishment (e.g., office) as larger than their entire employer and whether there were critical
missing responses (see Table 7 of Prescott et al. (2016) for the full list). Only 1.8% of the final
sample were flagged two or more times, with 82.2% receiving zero flags.
Although there are many benefits to using an online survey for this sort of study, one
challenge is that there is no easy-to-calculate response rate. In contrast to surveys of members of a
specific industry or organization where all possible respondents are in the population of interest, our
survey’s panel providers continuously sent invitations to a superset of potential respondents, many of
whom were not in the population of interest or otherwise eligible, until they reached a previously
agreed upon number of “complete surveys.” Among those who start the survey, we can exclude
anyone not in our population of interest (about 40%, Prescott et al. (2016) Table 2), but among
those who receive an invitation but never start the survey, we simply cannot know whether they
were in our population of interest. Our survey was marketed as a “work experiences survey” and
online survey respondents skew toward being unemployed or out of the labor force (Prescott et
al. (2016) Table 12), so it seems very likely that more than 40% of nonstarters were not in the
population of interest. In addition, we used quotas within the survey to ensure representativeness
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of the sample by income, education, gender, age, and geography. These quotas mechanically
reduce the response rate because, as a survey stays in the field and quota constraints begin to
bind, respondents who would otherwise qualify for the survey become newly ineligible. Toward
the end of a survey, when most quotas are full, thousands of e-mail invitations may be sent when
only a handful of respondents satisfy the remaining criteria.
We can report two helpful response-related statistics: the final sample divided by all of
those who started the survey who were within our population of interest (23%) and the final
sample over the total number of invitations (2%). The true response rate lies in between these
extremes. Our view is that these numbers, while perhaps on the low side, are in line with and
likely better than response rates to random-digit-dialing surveys, which were typically 6% in
2018 (Kennedy and Hartig 2019) and are similar to other noncompete surveys (see
comparison in Table A1). Importantly, and especially in this context, a low response rate is
not problematic per se; bias results only when reasons for nonparticipation are correlated
with unobservables and our outcomes of interest.
To give more context as to whom our survey respondents are and how seriously they
took the survey, we randomly chose 15 observations from the dataset and report their selfdescribed job titles, job duties, and industries in Appendix Table A2. The randomly chosen
job titles include a few sales representatives, a pizza delivery driver, an optometrist, a nurse,
a programmer, a legal aid provider, and others. The respondent-provided job descriptions are
quite detailed, as are the industry descriptions. In cleaning the data, we reviewed all 11,505
self-described job titles, job duties, and industries by hand in the process of creating
occupation and industry codes, and this review confirmed that the vast majority of
respondents wrote thoughtful responses to these questions.
While our various respondent quotas ensured that we collected a sufficiently large sample of
highly skilled employees (to account for their potential lack of representation in the online survey-
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taking population), one important question is whether our survey data are representative of the U.S.
labor force as a whole. Appendix Table A3 compares the demographics in our raw survey data to the
demographics of our population of interest in the 2014 American Community Survey (ACS). As
Table A3 shows, our raw sample is more educated and more female than the ACS sample. To
account for the quotas and to make sure that our data accurately reflect our population of interest, we
created weights for our analysis using iterative proportional fitting (“raking”) to match the marginal
distributions of key variables in the 2014 ACS. Table A3 shows that the weighted data closely align
with the American Community survey. In the end, our key findings are not sensitive to our weighting
strategy, and results from analyzing unweighted data are consistent with those we present here in
terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
One difficulty of studying noncompetes and their role in the employment setting is that some
employees are uncertain about whether they have a noncompete. In response to a survey question
asking (after defining a noncompete) whether the participant was currently bound by a noncompete,
respondents could effectively respond “yes,” “no,” or “maybe.” The unweighted distribution of
answers is 15.2% “yes,” 55.1% “no,” and 29.7% “maybe,” where the “maybe” category includes
those who have never heard of a noncompete (24.8%), those who do not know if they have signed
one (2.2%), those who do not want to say (0.23%), and those who cannot remember (2.5%). 6 Around
9% of labor force participants who have had a noncompete at some point in their lives report having
unknowingly entered into a noncompete in the past only to discover at a later time that they had in
fact indicated an intention to be bound (Starr et al. forthcoming). Thus, some fraction of individuals
in the “maybe” category (and probably a much smaller fraction of individuals in the “no” category)
are actually a party to a noncompete even though they are unaware of their status.

6
Starr et al. (forthcoming) report that the unweighted distribution among the full sample for whether an
individual has ever signed a noncompete in the past is 31.5% “yes,” 41.5% “no,” and 27% “maybe.” We asked those
individuals who answered “yes” or “no” how confident they were in their answer, and 74.2% report that they were
completely sure, while 23% reported that they were fairly sure.
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We address the uncertainty regarding whether an individual is subject to a noncompete in two
ways, although, importantly, our main conclusions are insensitive to how we treat “maybe”
respondents. First, to capture any effects of noncompetes when an employee is uncertain about their
noncompete status but when an employer is nevertheless presumably aware, we use standard
multiple imputation methods (e.g., King et al. 2001) to estimate whether individuals in the “maybe”
category had likely entered into a noncompete, based on the characteristics of the individuals in the
“yes” and “no” categories. 7 Effectively, we allocate the “maybe” respondents to either the “yes” or
“no” groups and proceed as if there were just two groups. Our main tables below report results based
on multiple imputation methods, except in those instances where respondents had to answer “yes” to
be able to answer the question of interest. One concern with this approach, however, is that “maybe”
respondents seem less likely to behave as if they are bound, especially if they have never heard of a
noncompete or cannot remember signing one—even if they are actually bound by one. For this
reason, we also separately analyze the mobility patterns of the “yes,” “no,” and “maybe” categories.
The results from using this way of coding noncompete status are substantively similar to our primary
results, and so we report them only in the appendix. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our
variables of interest in our sample of the U.S. labor force. The table presents mean differences
between those respondents who are and who are not presently subject to a noncompete.
<<COMP: Place Table 1 About Here>>

7

Specifically, we use chained multiple imputation to create 25 different datasets. For each one, we impute
whether the “maybe” respondents have ever signed a noncompete and, if so, whether they are currently subject to
one, along with a variety of other variables with missing observations (see Prescott et al. 2016 pp.446–55). Per
standard practice, we use dependent variables as controls in the imputation of the independent variable (e.g.,
noncompete status) (Stern et al. 2009) to avoid attenuation of our imputed estimates. We create our multiple
imputation estimates of the effects of noncompetes by estimating each model on the 25 different but complete
datasets, combining the point estimates, and correcting the standard errors to reflect the variation in the 25 estimates.
The result is an overall estimate that accounts for the uncertainty surrounding the “maybe” group. Our unweighted
multiple imputation estimates indicate that 19.9% of all individuals (which includes 16% of the “maybe”
respondents) are currently bound by a noncompete.
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Using this data, Starr et al. (forthcoming) provide the first systematic evidence regarding the
use of noncompetes across the labor force, finding that roughly one in five U.S. labor force
participants were bound by a noncompete in 2014. They establish that noncompetes are common for
all types of employees, with even 19% of individuals in nonenforcing states bound by one, equivalent
to the percentage of employees with noncompetes in the most vigorously enforcing states. For more
information on the differences between employees with and without noncompetes, see Starr et al.
(forthcoming).
4. Empirical Analysis
Identifying whether noncompetes matter for mobility in both enforcing and nonenforcing
states is challenging, requiring both exogenous variation in the use of noncompetes and exogenous
variation in noncompete enforceability. Prior studies relying on panel data to identify the effects of
noncompetes have exploited exogenous differences or changes in state policies (Marx et al. 2009,
Balasubramanian et al. 2020, Lipsitz and Starr 2020), but they do not employ information on
noncompete use; such data are generally unavailable. In the handful of studies with any data on
noncompete use, researchers have been unable to identify good instruments for the presence of a
noncompete (Marx 2011, Lavetti et al. 2020, Johnson and Lipsitz 2020).8 Our unique data on
noncompete use are ample in terms of sample size, representative of the U.S. labor force, and offer
comprehensive individual-level detail, but they are nevertheless cross-sectional. Accordingly, we
deploy an ensemble of different but mutually reinforcing methods to study the relationship between
noncompete use and mobility outcomes and subprocesses.
4.1 Empirical Strategy

8
Probably the most natural candidate instrument for noncompete use is the relative enforceability of
noncompete provisions—but as shown in Starr et al. (forthcoming), state-level noncompete enforceability is
virtually unrelated to actual noncompete use in a state.
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Our empirical approach is fourfold: First, we make use of the rich information in our data to
estimate highly saturated models that incorporate a comprehensive set of controls, including many
that are new to the noncompete literature and, to our knowledge, not present in any other data.
Second, whenever possible, we use within-individual between-competitor-and-noncompetitor
models, which net out common employee or employer fixed effects.9 Third, adopting the method
proposed in Oster (2017), which extends the method in Altonji et al. (2005), we explicitly test
whether our results are likely to be driven by selection on unobservables. 10 Finally, we examine
many distinct mobility-related outcomes and, when it matters most, we ask individuals directly about
the effects of noncompetes on their behavior and their predictions for the future. In the end, our
results—consistent across multiple approaches and many robustness checks—point in the same
direction and tell a coherent story.
To measure the relationship between the existence of a noncompete agreement and various
measures of mobility, we use OLS to estimate the following equations:
(1)

𝑌𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑜𝑗 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑠 ;

(2)

𝑌𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠
+ 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜔𝑜𝑗 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑠 ,

where 𝑌𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑠 represents various mobility-related outcomes including length of tenure, the competitorspecific reservation wage premium, and the likelihood of leaving for a competitor or a noncompetitor

We intentionally left the terms “competitor” and “noncompetitor” in the survey undefined, in line with the
vagueness and variety of actual noncompete contracts and consistent with allowing respondents to apply the
individualized interpretation of these terms that they would use to construe the scope of any noncompete. For
example, the survey asked respondents to estimate the likelihood that they would depart for a competitor in the next
year and separately asked respondents for the likelihood that they would leave for a noncompetitor. The survey also
used this approach to ascertain, by category of prospective employer (i.e., competitor versus noncompetitor), a
respondent’s recruitment experience, search effort, and offer receipt activity.
10
There may be other objections to a causal interpretation. For instance, simultaneity bias or reverse causation
may affect our estimates—e.g., in the tenure context, employers might ask employees who stay longer and rise
through the ranks to sign a noncompete midcareer. As to this particular example, any concern should be small. In
our sample, noncompetes are almost uniformly proposed at the outset of employment (Starr et al. forthcoming).
9
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(and later, job search effort, recruitment experience, and the receipt of offers) for employee 𝑖 in
occupation 𝑜, industry 𝑗, and state 𝑠.11 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖 is an indicator for whether the employee is
currently subject to a noncompete agreement. The set of controls 𝜔𝑜𝑗 accounts for any 2-digit
industry (NAICS) by 2-digit occupation (SOC) fixed effects while 𝛼𝑠 captures state fixed effects.
To measure the enforceability of covenants not to compete, we leverage a continuous
measure from Starr (2019), which reweighted a measure originally developed in Bishara (2011). As a
robustness check, we also use the continuous enforceability measure Garmaise (2009) constructs in
addition to simply dividing the sample into “enforcing” and “nonenforcing” states and re-running our
baseline specification within each group using the categorization in Beck (2014). The continuous
measures of enforceability (Bishara 2011, Starr 2019, Garmaise 2009) are constructed from primary
sources as well as the well-regarded state-by-state treatises edited by Malsberger (2012), which
describe the cases and statutes related to noncompete enforcement in each state. Malsberger
scrutinizes all key legal issues, including whether a noncompete can be enforced when an employee
is fired, whether additional contractual consideration is required beyond continued employment, and
whether and when overbroad provisions are valid, among many others.
Ideally, to estimate the enforceability of noncompetes in a state, one would like to know both
the conditions under which courts will enforce noncompetes and how likely those conditions are to
occur. The Malsberger series provide information on the former, but no study, to our knowledge,
possesses information on the latter. This distinction is important because if, for example, a state
declines to enforce noncompetes when an employee is involuntarily terminated, but involuntary
terminations are rare for employees in the state, then such a limitation on enforceability will have

11
In our analysis, we cluster the standard errors at the state level to account for any within-state correlations in
the disturbances, which is the appropriate strategy given the state-level enforcement of noncompetes (Moulton 1990;
Bishara 2011). In specifications using data only from respondents in nonenforcing states, our results are mostly
driven by California; few individuals represent North Dakota and Oklahoma in our survey data.
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minimal practical significance. Thus it is theoretically and practically important to weight the
dimensions of enforceability by their significance. Bishara (2011) does re-weight 7 dimensions of
enforceability (measured from 0–10), though in a subjective way. Starr (2019) improves on this
approach by using factor analysis to reweight the same scores as Bishara (2011) does. In contrast,
Garmaise (2009) assesses 12 dimensions of enforceability (scoring each dimension with a 0 or 1) and
adds them up, assuming each has the same influence on total enforceability. Given the potential
importance of weighting, we prioritize the Starr (2019) index and use the Garmaise (2009) score as a
robustness check, but all such measures are highly correlated and give similar results.12
We divide our individual-level controls, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 , into two distinct categories that we refer to as
basic controls and advanced controls. Our basic controls include employee gender, a third-degree
polynomial in employee age, employee education, hours worked by the employee per week, weeks
worked by the employee per year, the interaction of hours worked and weeks worked, class of the
employer (e.g., for profit, nonprofit), how the employee is paid (e.g., salary, hourly), employer-size
indicators, an indicator for multi-unit employers, the log of the number of establishments in the
employee’s county-industry, the log of the state unemployment rate as well as the log of the size of
the labor force in the state when the employee was hired. Our advanced controls add separate
indicators for whether the employee has a nondisclosure agreement, a nonpoaching agreement, a
nonsolicitation agreement, an IP assignment agreement, an arbitration agreement, and various
employee benefits including a retirement plan, employer-sponsored health insurance, paid vacation,
sick leave, and life insurance as well as indicators for how many employers the individual has had in
the last five years, the types of confidential information the employee currently possesses (e.g., trade

12

We normalize all continuous enforceability measures to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
(giving each state equal weight).
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secrets), and measures of employee flow from the employee’s employer to competitors, to the
employer from competitors, and between competitors in the industry generally. 13
We include this extensive set of controls not only to improve the precision of our estimates
but also to help separate treatment from selection by controlling for potentially omitted variables. 14
For example, consider the possibility that high-quality employers also tend to be legally sophisticated
and therefore more likely to use noncompetes, and that employees might especially enjoy working
for high-quality employers relative to other employers. Such a scenario would produce a spurious
negative relationship between noncompetes and mobility. To account for this possibility, our model
controls for measures of employer quality such as employer size, whether the employer is a multiunit entity, the use of other postemployment restrictive covenants and benefits (that legally
sophisticated, high-quality employers might also use), and poaching flows to and from the employer
(to capture the employer’s relative attractiveness to the focal employee). Selection concerns may
push in the opposite direction as well: if employees vary in their underlying propensity for mobility
and employers use noncompetes in an attempt to “root” their most valuable or mobile employees,
noncompetes may prove to be associated with more rather than less mobility. We address this
possibility by including controls for the number of employers an employee has had in the last five
years (i.e., a measure of previous mobility) and for the types of confidential information the
employee currently possesses (e.g., trade secrets, client information).

13
The inclusion of these advanced controls reduces the sample size from 11,462 to 11,010 because some of the
questions were not presented to all respondents. Unreported results from analysis that excludes the offending
controls (which are benefit-type indicator variables) does not materially change the magnitude or statistical
significance of our estimates. We omit earnings as a control from our regressions because compensation is also an
outcome and an employee’s noncompete status may directly affect their salary or wages.
14
We acknowledge that some of these advanced controls may also be “bad controls” in that a noncompete may
affect mobility outcomes through these covariates (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Our view is that our advanced
controls are more likely to eliminate omitted variable bias than operate as bad controls, but for sake of completeness,
we report estimates from specifications with and without both basic and advanced controls (below and in the
appendix).
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We complement this analysis with an additional, more powerful empirical strategy: using
within-individual differences as outcome variables in our regressions. Specifically, we subtract each
employee’s particular mobility outcomes (e.g., the probability of leaving within the next year) with
respect to “competitors” from the same outcomes with respect to “noncompetitors.” With this
approach, we eliminate any individual- or employer-level fixed effects that have equally strong
mobility implications for both competitors and noncompetitors. Consequently, in these
specifications, only factors that might differentially privilege competitors or noncompetitors remain
as sources of omitted variable bias. Such concerns could arise, for example, if employers who are
more likely to lose employees to competitors (as opposed to noncompetitors) are also more likely to
use noncompetes. This particular scenario seems realistic, so we include controls for an employer’s
poaching flows (both hires and departures). More important, a bias of this sort would cause us to find
that noncompetes are associated with an increased propensity for moving to a competitor over a
noncompetitor, the opposite of what we actually find in our data.
Notwithstanding our extensive set of controls and our within-individual differencing strategy,
we cannot control for every possible determinant of employee mobility that might correlate with
noncompete status. Thus, as another check, we assess the stability of our baseline results to potential
selection on unobservables (Oster 2017). The essence of this idea is that we can learn about selection
on unobservables by analyzing selection on observables—that is, by comparing coefficient and Rsquared movements between less saturated (by purposely omitting observables) and more saturated
models.15 Applying this approach, we report a test statistic, 𝛿, in our regression results that captures

15

The intuition of the our selection test is straightforward: when the R-squared rises significantly when moving
from a less to a more saturated model, but the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in question remain the same,
we can be relatively confident that selection on unobservables does not account for our results because there is
comparatively too little unexplained variation remaining (relative to the maximum possible R-squared) to plausibly
explain away the sign of the estimates. If, in contrast, the coefficient estimates fall dramatically as we add additional
controls, or the R-squared does not change at all with the inclusion of the new controls, then we should be relatively
less confident in the results. We use Oster’s (2017) Stata command “psacalc” in our work.
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how severe selection on unobservables would need to be relative to selection on (our extensive set
of) observables to drive our estimated treatment effect to zero. A value of 𝛿 = 1 indicates that
selection on unobservables would have to be just as strong as selection on observables to explain
away the direction and magnitude of our results. Oster (2017) recommends a threshold of 𝛿 > 1 as
reliable measure of estimate stability if the regression in question controls for all first-order outcome
determinants, and we use this cutoff as our touchstone.16
4.2 Baseline Mobility Patterns and Enforceability Effects
In Table 2, we present our baseline results on the relationship between noncompetes—
precisely, having a noncompete—and employee mobility. Panel A examines three dependent
variables: an indicator that the employee believes they will never leave their current employer for a
competitor, the log of the reported wage premium minimally required for a competitor to poach the
employee (conditional on the respondent being open to leaving their current employer for a
competitor in the first place),17 and the employee’s tenure with their current employer. Employee
tenure is not a traditional measure of mobility in that it does not track job-to-job transitions, but it
does capture the absence of prior mobility. Theoretically, the probability of a move is tightly linked
to observed tenure: for instance, a 10% probability of departure in each year results in an expected
tenure of 10 years. For each dependent variable, we estimate separate models with just our basic and
with both our basic and advanced controls, and we report the corresponding 𝛿 value from the
selection-on-unobservables test that compares these two models.
<<COMP: Place Table 2 About Here>>

16

The other parameters that we must choose to calculate this selection statistic are the maximum plausible Rsquared for the regression, which, per Oster’s recommendation, we set at 30% higher than the R-squared in the most
saturated model, as well as the two sets of controls to allow us to compare changes in the R-squared and coefficient
estimates. We implement the test by comparing the results of the model with our “basic” controls and fixed effects
to the same model with our “advanced” set of controls.
17
We operationalize the required wage premium in our empirical work as follows: If an individual reports that
they would need a 10% raise to join a competitor, the dependent variable would take on a value of ln(10).
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Our data indicate that employees with noncompetes are as much as 5.7 percentage points
more likely to say that they will never leave their employer for a competitor, a 69% increase relative
to the sample mean of 8.3%. Among those who are open to joining a competitor, noncompetes are
associated with a 17% (=e0.16) increase in the required competitor-specific wage premium (i.e., not
wage level). For tenure, noncompetes are associated with an additional 0.74 years of tenure on
average, which is an 11.3% increase relative to the sample mean of 6.6 years. The 𝛿 statistic is
greater than one in each of these specifications, suggesting that it would take implausibly serious
selection on unobservables for our results to be due entirely to selection bias.
Panel B of Table 2 examines three dependent variables related to the direction or type of
employee mobility: the subjective probability (on a scale from 0–100) that the employee will leave
for a competitor in the next year, the subjective probability that the employee will leave for a
noncompetitor in the next year, and the within-individual difference between these two outcomes.
The specification with advanced controls suggests that employees with noncompetes are 4.4
percentage points less likely to leave for a competitor (a 35% reduction relative to the sample mean
of 12.7%) and 0.53 percentage points less likely to leave for a noncompetitor, with only the former
estimate statistically significant. The estimate of the within-individual difference between a departure
to a competitor versus a noncompetitor indicates that employees with noncompetes are 3.9
percentage points less likely to move to competitors versus noncompetitors relative to an individual
not bound by a noncompete, which is 54% of the sample mean. The 𝛿 selection-test terms are greater
than one for the competitor model and the within-individual difference model.
This baseline analysis documents two important empirical relationships. First, noncompetes
result in longer employment tenures, which translates to lower overall employee mobility. Second,
noncompetes redirect employees who move from competitors toward noncompetitors. While other
research has anticipated these relationships by studying noncompetes in particular professions (Marx
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2011, Lavetti et al. 2020) or using state-level legal variation (Balasubramanian et al. 2020), our
results are the first to emerge from an analysis of a representative sample of the U.S. labor force that
incorporates information on the actual use of noncompetes and comprehensive employee-level data.
Before turning to whether noncompetes matter independent of the enforceability of such
provisions, we explore the robustness of these baseline conclusions by addressing a number of
potential data and methodological objections. To begin with, one natural concern is that our findings
may somehow be driven by our use of imputation or the precise way in which we impute the status of
our “maybe” respondents. As we note in Section 3, however, we address this concern directly by
separately analyzing those who report having agreed to noncompetes (“yes”) and those who were
uncertain about their noncompete status (“maybe”) in Appendix Table A4. We find that “yes”respondent behavior explains the key estimates we present in Table 2.
Doubts may also remain about our identification strategy. We use an extensive set of
controls, present within-individual estimates that should difference out most employee-level and
employer-level selection effects, and confirm that any selection on unobservables would need to be
implausibly severe to account for our results. Furthermore, our redirection results, in particular, seem
at odds with selection stories in which (1) the “best” employees are required to sign noncompetes
and/or (2) the “best” or more sophisticated employers disproportionately use noncompetes. Given our
results, these stories would imply that the “best” employees or employees at the “best” employers are
relatively more likely to leave their industry altogether absent a noncompete, which seems
counterintuitive at the very least. Together, these strategies and the consistency of our results across
outcomes should alleviate at least some of these lingering identification concerns.
Nevertheless, we also confirm our primary mobility results using a different and rarely
available empirical approach, at least when studying a sample as large as ours: asking individuals
directly. In particular, we ask survey respondents who have agreed to a noncompete at some point in
the past whether a noncompete has ever affected their prior mobility decisions and, if so, how. Table
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3 summarizes their reactions to this question and shows that a large fraction of these respondents do
report that noncompetes have limited their mobility (11.6% implicate noncompetes in their longer
tenures) and have redirected them toward different industries (12% report noncompete-based
redirection) in the past. Overall, 33% of those who have signed a noncompete in their lifetime (and
40.7% of the same group with more than a bachelor’s degree) acknowledge that noncompetes have
materially influenced their mobility decisions in some way. 18
<<COMP: Place Table 3 About Here>>
Given the evidence that noncompetes affect employee mobility generally, we now investigate
whether the relationship between noncompete status and our mobility measures changes in important
ways when we allow noncompetes to have differential effects based on their enforceability. If the
enforceability of a contract accounts for most or all contract-related behavior, we should expect to
see significant differences in employee mobility across distinct enforcement regimes. To test for this
possibility, we repeat our regression analysis but add to our specification an interaction term between
state-level noncompete enforceability and noncompete use (see equation (2)). We report results, only
for the most saturated models, in columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table 2. 19 In each specification, the main
effect we estimate for noncompete use maintains a similar magnitude and statistical significance

18
Interestingly, noncompete experiences and behavior vary across education levels. For instance, 8–9% of
individuals with a noncompete and at least a bachelor’s degree felt “obligated” not to join a competing employer,
compared to only 5.6% of those with less than a bachelor’s degree. Relatedly, the most educated individuals with
noncompetes were more likely to remain with an employer out of fear of subsequently facing litigation if they were
to leave, hinting at an employee belief that jilted employers may target higher-skilled individuals with enforcement
actions. Lastly, the highly educated are more likely to leave and wait for a noncompete to expire before joining a
competitor, potentially because they can afford the opportunity cost of such a choice. They are also the most likely
to geographically relocate or go back to school in response to a noncompete’s constraints. In line with this pattern in
the data, we recognize that prior noncompetes may have affected the existing distribution of occupations and
geography of employees. To understand the extent to which this sorting may occur, we asked respondents directly if
a prior noncompete (which could be theirs, a spouse’s, etc.) was a factor in determining where they currently live or
work. Overall, 11% of those who report ever signing a noncompete also report that a prior noncompete was a factor
in determining where they currently work, though there exists a substantial difference between those with (14%) and
without (8.3%) bachelor’s degrees. Furthermore, 6.9% of those who have ever signed a noncompete report that a
prior noncompete was a factor in determining where they live. This latter figure is somewhat larger for those with a
bachelor’s degree (8% vs. 6%).
19
We report less saturated models without state fixed effects in Table A5.
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relative to our earlier results. In contrast, the estimated coefficient on the noncompete enforceability
interaction term is small in magnitude in all specifications and statistically insignificant in all but one
case (in which it points in the “wrong” direction). Moreover, across models, the sign on the
interaction coefficient oscillates. To visualize these effects, Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of a
noncompete in an entirely nonenforcing state relative to an average enforcing state. As the interaction
analyses suggest, the marginal effect of a noncompete is largely similar in states that do not enforce
noncompetes and in states that do.
<<COMP: Place Figure 1 About Here>>
To provide more evidence on this point, Table A6 splits out the sample by the states that
enforce noncompetes at least at some level and those where noncompetes are virtually unenforceable.
Consistent with the results in Table 2, the estimates point in the same direction and maintain similar
levels of statistical significance regardless of noncompete enforceability. That is, even in states that
do not enforce noncompetes, employees who agree to be bound by such provisions show generally
lower mobility levels and evince redirection toward noncompetitors.20 Table A7 repeats the main
analysis in Table 2 but uses Garmaise’s (2009) measure of noncompete enforceability as an
alternative approach to probe the robustness of our conclusions. Again, the results we estimate are
substantively similar, with the exception that one measure—willingness to leave for a competitor—
appears to be marginally higher in states that more vigorously enforce noncompetes.
4.3 Mechanisms, the Mobility Process, and the In Terrorem Effect
Our evidence that noncompetes are associated with longer tenures (retention) and more
departures to noncompetitors relative to competitors (redirection), regardless of the law, says little
about precisely how noncompetes produce these mobility consequences. From a policymaking
20

Note that with only three nonenforcing states, per Beck (2014), clustering on state in the nonenforcing sample
effectively reduces the sample size to three. Accordingly, we report robust standard errors in the nonenforcing
specifications, which yield more conservative results.
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perspective, designing welfare-enhancing interventions requires understanding how noncompetes
operate at a behavioral level to influence employee decisions. In this section, we explore empirically
the mechanisms that might underlie the two noncompete-mobility relationships—retention and
redirection. We accomplish this by building on the search and matching literature’s recognition that
mobility derives from the generation of job offers from alternative employers and from employee
decisions to accept these offers. In theory, noncompetes can affect mobility outcomes by modifying
the function of one or both of these subprocesses.
4.3.1 Employment Offer Generation
We proceed by estimating variants of equation (1), replacing our previous dependent
variables to reflect the discrete elements that together constitute the mobility process (e.g., search)
rather than mobility itself (i.e., an employee receiving an offer, accepting an offer, and departing to a
new employer). Table 4 gives our main estimates for the relationship between the presence of a
noncompete and each of three different dimensions of the offer generation process: recruitment,
search, and offer receipt.
<<COMP: Place Table 4 About Here>>
Panel A examines whether an employee’s noncompete status is associated with their having
been recruited in the last year, one obvious precursor to an offer. The advanced controls are
important to this analysis: when we include only our basic controls, those bound by a noncompete
appear to be more attractive hiring prospects to alternative employers. Respondents with
noncompetes report receiving more recruitment attention all else equal. But this difference disappears
once we include our advanced controls; specifically, competitors are no more likely to recruit
employees with noncompetes (column (2)) in the last year relative to other employees. Employees
with noncompetes are also relatively more likely to receive attention from noncompetitors (column
(5)). Our within-employee difference estimates (column (8)) confirm that employees with
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noncompetes are relatively more likely to receive attention from noncompetitors than from
competitors (with no evidence that they receive less attention from competitors).
The results we present in Panel B of Table 4 for on-the-job search effort largely mirror the
findings of our recruitment analysis.21 We estimate that search effort directed toward competitors in
the last year, as measured from 0 to 10, is slightly lower for those who sign noncompetes, but not
statistically significantly so (column (2)), while the coefficient we estimate on search effort toward
noncompetitors is large, positive, and statistically significant (column (5)). Specifically, noncompetes
are associated with an additional 0.4 units of search effort toward noncompetitors (12% of the sample
mean). The relationship between a noncompete and the within-individual difference in search toward
competitors and noncompetitors is large and negative (-0.5 units, column (8)), implying that
employees with noncompetes are relatively more likely to redirect their on-the-job search effort away
from competitors and toward noncompetitors.
Taken together, we find no evidence that noncompetes themselves dissuade competitors from
recruiting employees with noncompetes nor do they appear to dissuade employees with noncompetes
from searching for employment opportunities with competitors. Even so, our results help to account
for our baseline finding that noncompetes are associated with employees being redirected toward
noncompetitors, aligning nicely with the “career detours” hypothesis (e.g., Marx 2011). Indeed, our
evidence illuminates at least two potentially important mechanisms underlying redirection:
noncompetitors are relatively more likely than competitors to recruit employees with noncompetes,
and employees with noncompetes are relatively more likely to search on the job for noncompetitor
positions than for competitor positions. One theory that might explain this dynamic is that

21

The results in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 may capture just one result instead of two. We do not know in
our data whether alternative employers might first have reached out to an employee who then engaged in “search” in
response; nor do we know whether an employee might first have searched for and then contacted an alternative
employer that subsequently “recruited” the employee as a result. If our respondents conflate recruitment and search
to some degree, our two sets of results may capture the same (or partially overlapping) actual interactions.
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noncompetes (even unenforceable ones) partially protect and therefore encourage employer
investments that increase employee quality generally, making employees with noncompetes more
attractive to all employers, including noncompetitors.
Mobility involving a new employer cannot occur without alternative employment offers,
however. Table 4 also considers the relationship between noncompetes and employment offers
received over the course of the last year (Panel C). The role of our advanced controls is also
important here: our basic controls alone would lead to the conclusion that employees with
noncompetes are more likely to receive job offers all else equal, but once we include the advanced
controls in our regressions, we find no difference in the offer probabilities for both competitors and
noncompetitors for the last year for individuals with noncompetes. Importantly, under both
specifications, we find no evidence that those with a noncompete are less likely to receive job offers
from alternative employers. We do observe that employees with noncompetes are more likely to
receive an offer from a noncompetitor during their tenure than from a competitor, but the estimate is
only marginally statistically significant (see Table A8).
In sum, the results we present in Table 4 demonstrate that employees with noncompetes are
not shut out and do not opt out of the early stages of the mobility process as some might predict (and
as some employers might intend). We find no evidence to indicate that those who are bound by
noncompetes receive less recruiting attention from competitors, nor is there evidence to support the
idea that employees with noncompetes forgo searching for new positions with competitors.
Moreover, the data demonstrate that, in fact, individuals with noncompetes engage in search activity
directed at noncompetitors and are recruited by noncompetitors at significantly higher rates than
employees without noncompetes. We also find that employees subject to noncompetes appear
somewhat more likely to receive offers from noncompetitors across their (longer) tenure.
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We now return to our primary focus—the possibility that noncompetes matter to the mobility
process regardless of state-level enforceability—by adding an interaction between noncompete
enforceability and employee noncompete status to our regressions.
The recruitment results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that while a noncompete is not
associated with any statistically significant reduction in the probability of being recruited by a
competitor (as before), the probability of a noncompete-bound employee being recruited by a
competitor is somewhat lower in higher enforceability states. But this reduction may be spurious.
Employees with noncompetes also appear less likely to be recruited by noncompetitors in states that
vigorously enforce noncompetes (and to an equal extent), although on average noncompetitors still
recruit employees with noncompetes at higher rates than other employees. Using our more robust
within-employee differencing approach, we continue to observe a large relative difference in
recruiting activity between competitors and noncompetitiors for those with noncompetes. By
comparison, the estimated coefficient on the enforceability interaction is near zero and not
statistically significant. Moreover, the associated standard errors imply that any enforceability effect
would be minor (compared to the effect of having a noncompete). Thus, in our data, enforceability
does not appear to deter competitors from recruiting those bound by noncompetes.
With respect to employee search behavior (Panel B), we discover a very similar pattern in our
data: no statistically significant enforceability differentials for those bound by noncompetes. On the
whole, employees with noncompetes appear to redirect search effort toward noncompetitors and
away from competitors without regard to their state’s level of noncompete enforcement, although,
unlike with recruitment, the point estimate on the interaction points in the “right” direction.
Enforceability appears weakly correlated with bound employees directing more search toward
noncompetitors, but the point estimate is small—less than one-fifth of the main effect of simply
having a noncompete, sizable even absent enforcement—and statistically insignificant.
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We turn finally to examining the role of enforceability in explaining the relative likelihood
that an employee with a noncompete has received a job offer in the last year (Panel C). Our results
indicate that, in higher enforceability states, employees bound by noncompetes are no less likely to
receive offers from competitors relative to employees without noncompetes (column (3)), but they
are more likely to receive offers from noncompetitors (column (6)), such that individuals bound by
noncompetes are more likely to receive offers from noncompetitors than competitors relative to the
unbound (column (9)).22 Put another way, individuals with noncompetes in our data appear to receive
at least as many job offers from both competitors and noncompetitors, regardless of enforceability, as
employees without noncompetes, but they receive relatively more offers from noncompetitors in
states that enforce noncompetes more intensively.
Overall, as before, our evidence suggests that noncompetes matter regardless of noncompete
enforceability. The story is more nuanced than in our baseline results, however. Drawing on our
within-respondent estimates, differences in employer recruitment activity and employee search
behavior associated with noncompetes do not appear to vary with the enforceability of
noncompetes.23 By contrast, the difference in whether an employee bound by a noncompete has
received a job offer in the last year does vary somewhat with the enforceability of these provisions in
the state. In higher enforceability states, those bound by noncompetes are relatively more likely to
receive job offers from noncompetitors than from competitors in the last year (possibly following
less recruitment but more search, according to our imprecise interaction estimates).

22
In Table A8, we report the results of a similar analysis, using as an outcome instead whether an employee has
received a job offer at any point while employed by their current employer. Our findings suggest that, as in the case
of recruitment activity, the enforceability of noncompetes is associated with fewer job offers from competitors for
those bound by noncompetes relative to other employees but job offers from noncompetitors also fall to the same
relative extent (though the point estimate on the noncompetitor interaction is statistically insignificant), such that the
estimated coefficient on the interaction term in the within-individual difference regression is small in magnitude and
statistically insignificant. We de-emphasize these results because the likelihood of having had a job offer since the
start of employment is correlated with an employee’s tenure.
23
Table A9 replicates Table 6 with the Garmaise (2009) measure of enforceability and finds similar results. We
report less saturated models in Appendix Table A10, which show substantively similar results.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 31
The potential asymmetries in these results (i.e., job offer behavior vs. on-the-job search and
job offer behavior vs. recruitment activity) may reflect the fact that employers are relatively more
knowledgeable about noncompete law than employees but also relatively uninformed about whether
any particular employee is likely to have a noncompete (until after initiating recruitment). Whatever
the mechanism, in the aggregate, these patterns suggest that employees bound by noncompetes in
states where noncompetes are easy to enforce may be more likely to leave their industry due to
higher offer rates from noncompetitors. But it is striking that there is no evidence that those with
noncompetes are less likely to receive job offers (from either competitors or noncompetitors) in the
prior year, regardless of the degree of noncompete enforceability.
4.3.2 Employment Offer Response
The puzzle that emerges from our work is that individuals with noncompetes appear to
engage in no less on-the-job search, entertain no less recruitment activity, and receive no fewer offers
from alternative employers on average, and yet they are less mobile, remaining at their employers
longer than employees without noncompetes (regardless of noncompete enforceability). We
hypothesize that one potential solution to this puzzle could be that, despite having similar job offer
opportunities in a given year (relative to those without noncompetes), individuals bound by
noncompetes simply decline their job offers at higher than average rates in both enforcing and
nonenforcing states. To investigate this possibility, we return to our data to determine whether a
noncompete influences an employee’s decision to decline an offer. We also explore how that
decision relates to an employee’s beliefs about their employer’s likely reaction to any departure to a
competitor and the law’s likely treatment of any legal action the employer pursues in response to
such a departure (regardless of actual noncompete enforceability).
Panel A of Table 5 presents a simple tabulation of answers in response to the question: “Was
your noncompete a factor in your choice to turn down the offer from a competitor?” Of applicable
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respondents—those who had noncompetes and turned down an offer from a competitor—41.5%
indicated that their noncompete was indeed a factor in their decision to decline their offer. This
proportion is similar in states that do (42.3%) and do not enforce (37.5%) noncompetes. Not all
employees receive offers from competitors, however; to gain statistical power, we also evaluate
responses to the following question: “If you received an offer from a competitor, would your
noncompete be a factor in your choice to reject it?” A comparable 47.6% report that a noncompete
would be a factor, with similar proportions in enforcing and nonenforcing states. Panel C tabulates
the importance of a noncompete as a factor, with 54.2% of those who report it would be a factor
stating that a noncompete would be somewhat, very, or extremely important in their decision.
According to this evidence, employees with noncompetes are declining offers from competitors at
significant rates because of their noncompete.
<<COMP: Place Table 5 About Here>>
To probe why employees may view their noncompete as a barrier to accepting a job offer
(and becoming mobile), we begin by asking why respondents who indicate that their employer
remained unaware of the competitor’s offer nevertheless attribute their choice to decline an
employment offer to their noncompete status. The estimates in column (1) of Table 6 show that
individuals who know that their employer has sued a former employee to enforce a noncompete
agreement in the past are 16 percentage points more likely to report their noncompete as a reason for
turning down a competitor’s offer. Furthermore, individuals who are “certain” that their employer
will sue them over their noncompete and that a court will enforce that agreement are 61 percentage
points more likely to answer that a noncompete was a factor in their choice to decline an offer
relative to individuals who are certain that their employers will not sue and that a court will not
enforce their noncompete. Importantly, employee beliefs about noncompete enforceability and
beliefs about the likelihood of an employer filing a lawsuit are much more predictive of a
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noncompete being a factor in refusing an offer than actual enforceability under state law, which we
estimate to play a very small and statistically insignificant role (column (2)).
<<COMP: Place Table 6 About Here>>
Once an employer is made aware that an employee has received an offer from a competitor,
the employer has the option of intervening and reminding the employee of their contractual
obligation not to compete by joining a competitor. In column (3) of Table 6, ignoring at first this
possibility of strategic “reminders,” we report the coefficients we estimate for this population and
find that they are very similar to those in column (2). However, when we account for the fact that
employers often remind employees of their noncompete upon learning of the offer (which occurs
40% of the time), the coefficients on our subjective belief variables fall substantially while the
coefficient on “reminding” is large at 40.7 percentage points (column (4)). These estimates imply,
first, that an employer’s choice to simply remind its bound employees of their noncompete
obligations has a strong positive association with whether an employee will turn down an offer from
a competitor and, second, that employees who receive reminders are far more likely to believe that
their employer will sue them and/or that a state will enforce their noncompete. 24
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The core idea we explore in this paper is whether contracts (noncompetes) influence
economic behavior (the rate and direction of mobility) independent of the governing law—i.e., do
unenforceable contracts matter on the their own and in comparison with enforceable ones? In the

24

Only 21% of our sample reports receiving an offer from a competitor, so we test the robustness of this
analysis using the same specification to study whether an employee’s noncompete would be a factor in a
hypothetical case in which the employee receives an offer from a competitor (i.e., the question and responses listed
in Panel B of Table 5). The sample of respondents answering this question includes all individuals with
noncompetes (both reported and imputed). We find results similar to the estimates we report in column (2) of Table
6. Specifically, an employee’s beliefs about the likelihood of a lawsuit and the likelihood that a court would enforce
the noncompete in question are strongly positively associated with the choice to report that a noncompete is a factor
in the choice to decline an offer.
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context of covenants not to compete, research to date focuses almost entirely on differences in state
enforcement policies, likely due to limited access to data on existing contracts. But contracts on
paper and in hand may produce in terrorem behavioral effects without regard to “law,” and legal
scholars have speculated for years that unenforceable, invalid, and even unlawful contracts may
dramatically alter party behavior, particularly when the party is unaware of the law. Accordingly, this
paper’s most important contribution—which derives from a novel survey effort to gather nationally
representative data on noncompete use—is to empirically substantiate the hypothesis that contracts
matter independent of the laws governing their enforceability.
To this end, we find that a noncompete is associated with both a longer tenure and a reduced
propensity to leave for a competitor even when the noncompete in question is unenforceable under
state law. Moreover, we decompose the mobility process into its subcomponents (offer generation
and offer response) to identify where these mobility differences might accrue. The offer generation
analysis reveals no evidence that employees bound by noncompetes engage in less search, experience
less recruitment, or receive fewer offers relative to those not bound by noncompetes, though
individuals with noncompetes do exhibit increased search effort toward and appear to receive
additional recruitment activity from noncompetitors. These results also appear to be largely
independent of enforceability, with the exception that job offers from noncompetitors are more
common for the noncompete bound in higher enforceability states (potentially due to asymmetric
knowledge of the law). In turn, the offer response analysis demonstrates that—in both enforcing and
nonenforcing states—approximately 40% of employees with noncompetes identify their noncompete
as a factor in turning down job offers from competitors. Finally, we document that beliefs about
noncompete enforceability and the likelihood of being sued, as well as simple reminders by the
employer, are strong predictors of whether an employee will decline an offer from a competitor,
while the actual content of the law appears to be irrelevant. Taken together, these results provide the
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first rigorous evidence of an in terrorem effect in the noncompete context, including with respect to
unenforceable contracts, for which any threat to sue is unlikely to be credible.
Before we turn to future research and policy implications, we revisit and highlight several
limitations of our study, especially as they relate to the prior literature. First, because our data come
from a cross-sectional survey, we can only track the absence of prior mobility (job tenure) and cannot
track actual job-to-job transitions by respondents. We overcome this challenge by using prospective
questions about respondent intentions to measure future mobility as well as retrospective evidence on
prior job moves, search effort, recruitment, and the receipt of job offers. To our knowledge, no
longitudinal data on the use of noncompetes and actual mobility events exist for anything like a
nationally representative sample of employees. Second, along with the few other studies of
noncompete use (Marx 2011, Johnson and Lipsitz 2020), we lack a credible source of exogenous
variation in noncompete use, so our point estimates should be interpreted as causal with caution. Our
multipronged approach to corroborate our baseline results is to use a rich and comprehensive set of
controls, to estimate within-individual competitor versus noncompetitor models whenever possible,
to test for susceptibility to selection bias, and to simply ask employees directly about their
experiences. The story that emerges is consistent and commonsensical.
Nevertheless, selection into noncompete status may be conditionally nonrandom. For
example, our regressions with only basic controls indicate that employees bound by noncompetes are
relatively more attractive to employers. This could be causal—e.g., if such employees are afforded
access to training, trade secrets, or customer lists that make them more valuable—or it could instead
reflect the types of employers that use noncompetes or the types of employees who enter into such
agreements. When we add our advanced controls, employees with noncompetes no longer appear
clearly more attractive. What do we make of this change? Are the advanced controls shutting off
channels through which noncompetes influence mobility, or are they solving an omitted variables
problem? Further inspection reveals that our estimates are most sensitive to the inclusion of other

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 36
contractual provisions (e.g., nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, etc.). These contracting terms seem likely
to reflect employer sophistication, and their effects likely load on the noncompete variable when we
omit them from the model. Regardless, including these controls does little to change the result that
noncompete enforceability seems unnecessary for noncompetes to affect behavior.
Similarly, because we do not possess longitudinal data to exploit some of the recent changes
in noncompete laws, we are unable to carefully estimate the causal effect of noncompete
enforceability. Instead, we document that those who are bound by noncompetes exhibit different
mobility patterns than other employees, and that these differences persist in states that do and do not
enforce noncompetes. With regard to this limitation, our results raise the question of how our
findings cohere with the existing empirical evidence that employee mobility appears to be lower in
states that enforce noncompetes (Marx et al. 2009; Garmaise 2009; Balasubramanian 2020). We do
not believe there is a clear inconsistency with respect to our paper’s main contribution. First and
foremost, our analysis documents the existence of noncompete mobility effects in both nonenforcing
and enforcing states, not that robust enforcement has no impact. Indeed, our work implies that
existing work may underestimate the combined effect of (1) a noncompete in (2) an enforcing state
by assuming that variation in enforcement identifies the full effect of a noncompete.
Still, we also find little evidence that the mobility effects of noncompetes vary across
enforcement regimes, which at least seems inconsistent with prior scholarship. Beyond the fact that
our interaction estimates simply fail to reject a null hypothesis of no difference, there are several
explanations that may account for this discrepancy. We broadly group these possibilities as related to
measurement, identification, and sampling.
In the measurement category, our mobility outcomes (tenure and subjective probabilities of
leaving in the next year) are not the ones employed by the rest of the literature, which generally
capture job-to-job mobility. Our findings may thus emphasize the importance of mobility
measurement. Another potential measurement issue is how best to capture the enforceability of
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noncompetes. Some studies exploit changes over time (e.g., bans) (Balasubramanian et al. 2020,
Lipsitz and Starr 2020), while others measure cross-state enforceability differences in some way.
Given our data, the cross-state measures are the best we can do, and our results are largely robust to
all reasonable and available measures. Measurement issues are also central to the interpretation and
substance of other noncompete studies, which do not analyze information as detailed as our data on
the actual use of noncompetes, job offers, beliefs, etc. As a result, these studies are unable to show
that any effects of law they identify are attributable to those bound by noncompetes. Our work begins
to fill this gap by stressing that a noncompete may matter independent of the law.
Causal identification—especially within a cross-sectional survey—is always challenging, and
despite our numerous attempts to carefully understand the biases that might arise and to suitably
address them, significant caveats remain in our paper. Identifying assumptions, of course, exist
throughout the noncompete literature and may account for apparent inconsistencies.
Finally, it is worth underscoring the differences in our sample composition: prior studies
examine inventors (Marx et al. 2009, Marx et al. 2015), high tech workers (Balasubramanian et al.
2020), CEOs (Garmaise 2009), and physicians (Lavetti et al. 2020). These occupations comprise a
small fraction of the U.S. labor force (and of our sample), and the average labor force participant
likely has a different level of sophistication with respect to these provisions and their enforceability
relative to highly compensated employees. Understanding the effects of employment noncompetes
across a diverse workforce is an important direction for future work.25
All of these limitations notwithstanding, our results—if replicated with other samples, data,
and designs—have important implications for understanding employment mobility constraints, the

25

Our work also raises several new questions for future research. What do employees and employers know
about the law, and how is that knowledge gained and diffused across organizations, industries, and regions? Do
employers know which types of potential employees are bound by noncompetes and how do they decide whether
and when to recruit them? To what extent do these same issues extend to other, similar restrictive provisions, like
nonsolicitation or nondisclosure agreements?
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effects of unenforceable contracts and the noncompete public policy debate. Furthermore, assuming
noncompete use has been rising over time, our results also have implications for the supposed decline
in labor market fluidity (Davis and Haltiwanger 2014; Decker et al. 2014). Assuming our results
accurately reflect at least the direction of noncompete effects, policymakers wishing to spur mobility
via noncompete reform may want to consider policies limiting the use of noncompetes themselves
rather than weakening enforcement. Information campaigns may also make a difference. The fact
that beliefs about enforceability and reminders matter for mobility decisions, even where
noncompetes are unenforceable, emphasizes the scope for in terrorem effects via misinformation and
manipulation. Today, many employees may turn down a job offer they would have otherwise taken
simply because they incorrectly believe their noncompete is enforceable.
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Tables & Figures
Figure 1. Marginal Noncompete Effect in Nonenforcing and Average Enforcing States
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample
Statistic
Enforceability of Noncompetes
Tenure (Years)
1(Would never leave employer)
Ln (Required Competitor Wage Premium)
P(Leave for a competitor)
P(Leave for a noncompetitor)
Search effort towards competitor (0-10)
Search effort towards noncompetitor (0-10)
1(Recruited by competitor in last year)
1(Recruited by noncompetitor in last year)
1(Competitor offer in last year)
1(Noncompetitor offer in last year)
1(Competitor offer while employed)
1(Noncompetitor offer while employed)
Subjective P(Firm will sue if leave for competitor)
Subjective P(Court would enforce noncompete)

All
Mean
-0.23
6.58
0.08
2.92
12.70
19.96
2.69
3.34
0.21
0.25
0.10
0.12
0.21
0.25
38.44
42.94

All
SD
1.46
7.26
0.28
0.94
21.94
29.11
3.05
3.33
0.40
0.43
0.30
0.32
0.41
0.44
35.83
37.48

Noncompete
Mean
-0.24
7.00
0.11
3.07
12.05
20.96
2.76
3.73
0.29
0.38
0.15
0.17
0.28
0.36
37.88
41.01

No Noncompete
Mean
-0.22
6.48
0.08
2.89
12.84
19.74
2.67
3.26
0.19
0.22
0.09
0.10
0.19
0.23
38.57
43.37

∆
Mean
-0.02
0.52
0.03**
0.18***
-0.79
1.22
0.09
0.47***
0.10***
0.15***
0.06***
0.06***
0.09***
0.13***
-0.68
-2.36

1(Knows employer sued others re: noncompete)
0.06
0.24
0.20
0.03
0.16***
Note: Standard errors for the differences between the means for employees with noncompetes and those without noncompetes are clustered
at the state level. In our sample, 18.1% of the respondents report that they are currently bound by a noncompete, and 38.1% have signed
one at some point in their lives. See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara (forthcoming) for more details on who signs noncompetes. These estimates
refer to the full sample of 11,505 respondents. The enforceability of noncompetes is from Starr (2019), and the measure is constructed to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in a sample in which each state has equal weight.
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Table 3: How Has a Noncompete Affected Your Choice to Stay at or Leave an Employer?
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Noncompetes and the Choice to Stay
Delayed
Stayed out
Companies
leaving
of fear of
would not
lawsuit
hire due to
noncompete

(4)

(5)

(6)

Stayed b/c
felt
obligated
not to
compete

Paid
more
money to
stay

Negotiated
scope or
waiver

(7)

<Bachelor’s
Bachelor’s
>Bachelor’s

11.4%
12.0%
11.9%

5.0%
5.9%
7.7%

5.7%
6.5%
6.8%

5.6%
9.0%
8.6%

4.0%
7.4%
8.7%

1.2%
3.9%
4.3%

Overall

11.6%

5.7%

6.1%

7.0%

5.7%

2.5%

Tried to
prevent
prior
employer
from
learning

Moved
locations

Went to
school

Never
been a
factor in
choice to
leave

2.2%
2.3%
3.0%

1.9%
2.4%
4.4%

1.9%
2.3%
4.0%

70.3%
66.9%
59.3%

Panel B: Noncompetes and the Choice to Leave
Left the
Left,
Joined
industry
waited for
competitor
expiration,
who could
then joined protect from
competitor
lawsuit

<Bachelor’s
Bachelor’s
>Bachelor’s

12.0%
12.6%
11.3%

5.2%
7.3%
10.2%

2.1%
3.2%
5.1%

Overall
12.0%
6.6%
2.9%
2.4%
2.4%
2.3%
67.5%
Note: Numbers are percentages conditional on education category. Responses are only for those who
report having signed a noncompete at some point in their lives (not including those who were imputed to
have signed).
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Table 5: Turning Down Job Offers
(1)
Sample

All

(2)
States That Do
Not Enforce
Noncompetes

(3)
States That
Enforce
Noncompetes

Panel A: Was your noncompete a factor in your choice to turn down your offer from a
competitor?
Yes
41.5%
37.5%
42.3%
Panel B: If you received an offer from a competitor, would your noncompete be a factor in
your choice to accept it?
Yes

47.6%

46.6%

47.8%

Panel C: How important is your noncompete in determining if you leave for a competitor?
Not at all Important
Very Unimportant
Somewhat Unimportant
Neither Important nor Unimportant
Somewhat Important
Very Important
Extremely Important

9.3%
5.0%
6.1%
25.3%
21.7%
16.5%
16.0%

5.8%
5.0%
5.1%
26.1%
23.4%
16.2%
18.5%

9.9%
5.0%
6.3%
25.2%
21.4%
16.5%
15.6%

Somewhat or Very or Extremely
Important

54.2%

58.1%

53.5%

Note: Panel A includes individuals who report signing a noncompete and reported turning down an offer from a
competitor while employed (N=604). Panel B analyzes a hypothetical question and includes all individuals who
have either reported signing a noncompete or have been imputed to have signed a noncompete (N=2,261). Panel
C, like Panel B, includes all individuals who either reported signing or were imputed to sign (N=2,261) .
Nonenforcing states include California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, per Beck (2014). Enforcing states are all
others. The difference in Panel A between enforcing states and nonenforcing states is not statistically significant.
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Appendix A. Additional Tables
Table A1: Comparison to Other Studies
Study

Population

% US
Labor
Force

Data Source

Sample Size

Response
Rate

Noncompete
Incidence

Schwab and Thomas
(2006)

Executives

0.18%

The Corporate Library, SEC
EDGAR

375 Executives

N/A

67.5%

Garmaise (2009)

Executives

0.18%

Execucomp Firms with 10-K,
10-Q SEC Filings

500 Firms

N/A

70.2%

Bishara et al. (2015)

Executives

0.18%

SEC EDGAR

500 Firms

N/A

78.7%

Marx (2011)

Electrical and
Electronics
Engineers

0.23%

Survey of Institute of
Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (Professional
Association)

1,029 Individuals

20.6%

43.3%

Lavetti et al. (2020)

Physicians

0.47

Survey of Professional
Beauty Association

1,967 Individuals

69.8%

45.1%

Johnson and Lipsitz
(2020)

Hair Stylists

0.25%

Survey of Professional
Beauty Association

218 Hair Salons

4%-31%

30.0%

This study

US Labor
Force

100%

Qualtrics (with 7 online
survey panel providers)

11,505
Individuals

2%-23%

18.1%

Note: % of US Labor Force is based on the 2014 BLS Occupational Employment Survey:
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ocwage_03252015.pdf
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Table A2. Self-Described Occupation Title, Duties, and Industry for 15 Randomly Selected Respondents
Occupation Title

Self-Described Occupation Duties

Self-Described Industry

1

Associate Analyst

My current job duties are to review and evaluate telephone
recordings between our customers and customer contact
representatives.

My current employer is a regional utilitiy company
which provides/sells electricity and natural gas to
residential and commercial customers.

2

project manager

Design and staff community health clinics, write proposals,
seek funding, evaluate and educate

Ensure children of low income families get preventive
health and treatment if necessary

3

Quality Assurance Director

Review reports before going to our clients

Insurance Inspection Services

4

optometrist

Care for patient's ocular health

Optometry

5

purchasing clerk

6

sales rep

7

Sales Associate

8

Programmer analyst

9

Customer Service

10

Certified Medical Assistant

11

Analyst

12

I have receptionist duties including purchasing office supplies retail art gallery
and filing the shipping department's paperwork.
account manager for a sales base

sells office supplies and equipment

Sell phones and other communication devices, assist
customers and resolve issues.

Retail sales company for cell phone business

Software developer

IT Consulting

I take phone calls from Customers.

My employer provides Health Insurance.

Assist the doctor in the office and minor office procedures
while making sure the office runs efficiently.

Healthcare provider

researching our site's traffic

Publishing

Registered Nurse

I am responsible for providing dialysis services to current
inpatients

It is a rehabilitation hospital

13

Title Coordinator

Process recorded deed of trust

Issue title policies

14

LEGAL ASSISTANT

INTERACT W/STATE BOARD OF WORKERS'COMP,
PROVIDE PERSONAL INJURY REPRESENTATION,
INVOLVES HIPAA LAWS

PERSONAL INJURY/WORKERS' COMP
ATTORNEY

15

delivery driver

deliver food to people

pizza
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Table A3: Distribution Comparison Between Weighted and Unweighted Noncompete Survey Project Data and 2014 American
Community Survey
Variable
NSP Data
ACS
NSP-ACS Difference
Unweighted Weighted
Unweighted
Weighted
1(< Bachelor’s Degree)
0.48
0.69
0.70
-0.22***
-0.01
1(Bachelor’s Degree)
0.37
0.21
0.20
0.16***
0.01
1(> Bachelor’s Degree)
0.16
0.10
0.10
0.06***
0.00
1(Work ≥ 40 Hours per Week)
0.70
0.71
0.72
-0.02***
-0.01
1(Male)
0.47
0.53
0.53
-0.07***
0.00
Age
41.98
40.33
40.55
1.43***
-0.22
Note: This table shows the distribution of demographic characteristics between the Noncompete Survey Project Data, both weighted
and unweighted, and the 2014 American Community Survey. The weighted data use raking weights, as described in the text and
Prescott et al. (2016). In the difference columns, the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A8: Receipt of Offers While Employed
(1)

(2)
Competitor

Noncompete

Advanced Controls

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Dependent Variable: 1(Offer while employed from)
Noncompetitor

(8)

(9)

∆

0.055***
(0.016)

-0.005
(0.018)

-0.008
(0.018)
-0.014*
(0.007)

0.096***
(0.020)

0.039*
(0.021)

0.036*
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.011)

-0.040*
(0.021)

-0.043*
(0.022)

-0.044*
(0.023)
-0.003
(0.009)

0.129
11,462
Yes

0.191
11,010
Yes

0.191
11,010
Yes

0.104
11,462
Yes

0.142
11,010
Yes

0.142
11,010
Yes

0.093
11,462
Yes

0.111
11,010
Yes

0.111
11,010
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Noncompete×Enforceability

R-Squared
Observations
Basic Controls

(3)

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ∆ refers to the difference between competitors and
noncompetitors for the relevant dependent variable. Basic and advanced controls are described in the text and in Table 2.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 58

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 59

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858637

Starr 60
Appendix B. Data Appendix26
This paper’s data derive from a labor force (i.e., employee) survey that we designed and
implemented between April and July 2014. Our goal in conducting the survey was to understand the
use and effects of covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”), both in the respondent’s current job
and throughout the respondent’s career. In this appendix, we describe the details of the survey’s
origin, design, sampling frame, data cleaning, and data processing that are critical to understanding
the empirical work in this paper. We draw heavily on the technical paper that describes these issues
in meticulous detail (Prescott et al. 2016).
A.1 Sampling Frame and Data Collection Methodology
The sampling frame for this study are U.S. labor force participants aged 18–75 who are
working in the private sector (for-profit or nonprofit), working for a public health system,27 or
unemployed and looking for work. We excluded individuals who reported being self-employed,
government employees, and non-US citizens, and those who are out of the labor force. To collect the
data, we considered numerous possible survey platforms and collection methods, including using
RAND’s American Life Panel (ALP), a random digit dial survey, and adding questions to ongoing
established surveys like the NLSY or the PSID. Ultimately, we concluded that our work required a
nationally representative sample that was larger than the ALP could provide. We also determined
that, to obtain a complete picture of an employee’s noncompete experiences, we needed to collect too
many different pieces of new information to build on existing surveys. Instead, it made much more
sense to design and draft the survey ourselves so that we would be able to ask all of the potentially

26

This description of the 2014 Noncompete Survey Project is identical in substance to the data appendix in
Starr et al. (forthcoming). We include it here for convenience.
27
We initially considered focusing only on the private sector, but we eventually recognized that public
healthcare systems (e.g., those associated with a public university) also use noncompetes extensively.
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relevant questions. We ultimately settled on using Qualtrics, a reputable online survey company with
access to more than 10 million verified panel respondents.28
The target size for this data-collection project was 10,000 completed surveys. We were able
to control the characteristics of the final sample through the use of quotas, which are simply
constraints on the numbers of respondents with particular characteristics or sets of characteristics. In
particular, we sought a final sample in which respondents were 50% male; 60% with at least a
bachelor’s degree; 50% with earnings of at least $50,000 annually from their current, highest paying
job; and 30% over the age of 55. We chose these numbers either to align the sample with the
corresponding sample moments for labor force participants in the 2012 ACS or to oversample certain
populations of interest.
Respondents who completed the survey were compensated differently depending on the
panel provider: some were paid $1.50 and entered into prize sweepstakes, others were given tokens
or points in online games that they were playing. The median survey took the survey taker
approximately 28 minutes to complete. Due to the length of the survey, we used three “attention
filters” spaced evenly throughout the survey to ensure that respondents were paying attention to the
questions. Before we describe the cleaning process of the survey, we briefly describe the costs and
benefits of online surveys. The information contained in the following sections can be found in
Tables 1–18 in Prescott et al. (2016).
A.2 Costs and Benefits of Online Surveys

28

The difference between verified and unverified survey respondents is important. The use of unverified survey
respondents means that there is no external validation of any information the respondent provides (e.g., a Google or
Facebook survey), while verified survey respondents have had some information verified by the survey company.
We signed up with a number of survey companies as potential respondents to see how they vetted individuals who
signed up to respond to surveys. A typical experience involves filling out an intake form, providing wide-ranging
information, and including a contact number. A day or so after completing the intake form, the applicant receives a
phone call from the survey company at the number the applicant provided. On the call, the applicant is asked a series
of questions related to the information previously provided on the intake form. Verified respondents are those who
are reachable at the phone number supplied and who corroborate the information initially supplied.
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Online surveys come with a variety of benefits. Relative to random-digit-dialing or in-person
surveys, the cost per respondent is orders of magnitude lower and the data-collection time is orders of
magnitude faster. The interactive survey interface also allows the survey designer to write
complicated, nested questions that are easy for respondents to answer on the online platform. Online
surveys also allow individuals to respond at their leisure and via their preferred method (e.g.,
computer, phone, tablet, etc.) and at their preferred place (e.g., at work, home, coffee shop). For these
reasons, Reuters, the well-known national polling company, has conducted all of its polling since
2012 online, including its 2016 Presidential election polling.29
These benefits come at a potentially high cost: a sample of online survey takers may not
necessarily be representative of the population of interest to researchers. There are four sample
selection concerns in particular. First, not all people in the U.S. labor force are online. Second, not all
of those online register to take surveys. Third, not all of those who register to take surveys receive
any particular survey. Fourth, not all of those who are invited to take a survey finish it. Among these
sample selection concerns, only the second one is unique to online surveys.30 With respect to the
fourth, alternatives seem unlikely to be better. Kennedy and Hartig (2019) find that survey response
to random-digit dialing fell to 6% in 2018, raising the very important question whether the sample
resulting from a random-digit-dial survey is still a random sample of the population. We address each
of these selection concerns in detail in Prescott et al. (2016) and discuss the second concern in
particular in the section on sample selection.
A.3 Survey Cleaning

See the “About” tab at http://polling.reuters.com/.
For example, random-digit dial surveys miss those without a phone, all those with a phone may not receive a
phone call, and those who do get the call but decline the survey.
29
30
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Qualtrics fielded the survey and obtained 14,668 completed surveys. When we began to
review this initial set of responses, we recognized that individuals with the same IP address may have
taken the survey multiple times given there were incentives. To address this issue, we retained only
the first attempt at the survey from a given IP address and only if that attempt ended in a completed
survey, which produced a sample of 12,369 respondents.
We next detected, by inspecting the raw data by hand, that some individuals appeared to have
the exact same responses, even on write-in questions, despite the fact that the IP addresses recorded
in the survey data were different. To weed these out, we compared individual responses for those
with the same gender, age, and race, living in the same state and zip code, and working in the same
county. We found 665 possible repeat survey takers, the majority of whom took the survey with a
different panel partner. We reviewed these potential repeat survey takers by hand and among those
identified as repeat takers from different IP addresses, we kept the first observation and dropped all
others, leaving us with a sample of 12,090 respondents.31
In the next round of cleaning, we examined individual answers to identify any that were
internally inconsistent or unreasonable in substance. In doing so, we developed a “flagging”
algorithm that flagged individuals for making mistakes within or across questions, in addition to
manually reading through text entry questions. In analyzing these answers, we discovered that some
individuals were intentionally noncompliant (e.g., they wrote curse words instead of their job title),
and some who simply made idiosyncratic errors (e.g., noting that their entire employer was smaller
than their establishment—i.e., their particular office or factory). We dropped respondents entirely if
they were deemed intentionally noncompliant because their singular responses indicated that they did
not take the survey seriously. This step left us with 11,529 responses.32

31
32

See Tables 3–5 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
See p.412–14 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
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In the last round of cleaning, we began with those who either had clean surveys or who had
made some sort of idiosyncratic error. From our flagging algorithm, we determined that 82.2% had
no flags and that 16.05% had just one flag (Table 6 in Prescott et al. (2016)). The most common flag
was for reporting earnings below the minimum wage (often 0), which was true for 1,007 of the
11,529 respondents. The challenge we faced was how to handle these flagged variables. We adopted
four approaches: The first was to do nothing—simply retain all of offending values as they were. The
second was to drop all observations with any flag. The third was to replace offending values as
missing. The fourth was to impute or otherwise correct offending values. Our preferred method, and
the one we use in this paper (although our findings are not very sensitive to this choice), was to
impute or correct these offending values. Specifically, we “repaired” entries that are marred by
idiosyncratic inconsistency by replacing the less reliable offending value with the value closest to the
originally submitted value that would not be inconsistent with the respondent’s other answers. When
an answer was clearly unreasonable or missing, and there was no workable single imputation
procedure, we applied multiple imputation methods to calculate a substitute value for the original
missing or unreasonable survey entry.
We also reviewed by hand the values of reported wages, occupations, and industries, due to
their importance in our work. With regard to wages, we manually reviewed all reported wages
greater than $200,000 and cross-checked them with the individual’s job title and job duties to ensure
the attribution was appropriate. We also examined potential typos in the number of zeros (e.g., there
is a big difference between $20,000 and $200,000, but they may appear similar to survey
respondents) by comparing reported annual earnings to the expected annual earnings next year. If a
typo was made by omitting a zero or including an extra zero, we would expect to see a ratio of 0.1 or
10. We corrected all such entries by examining the number of zeros reported as expected earnings in
subsequent years. We imputed wages that were clearly unreasonable and that we were unable to
correct in a reasonable way. With regard to occupation and industry, we had respondents self-select
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2-digit NAICS and SOC codes within the survey and also report their job title, job duties, and what
their employer produced or sold.33 To verify the 2-digit NAICS and SOC codes—which are crucial
for both weighting and fixed effects in any subsequent analysis—we had four sets of RAs
independently code the 11,529 responses by taking job titles, job duties, and employer descriptions
and matching them with the appropriate 2-digit NAICS and SOC codes.34 As part of this process, we
found that 24 individuals were self-employed, worked for the government, or were retired, thus
reducing our total number of respondents to 11,505.
The above process produced our final sample. Next we examine sample selection concerns,
weighting, and how we correct for missing data using multiple imputation.
A.4 Sample Selection
As we observe above, there are four primary sample selection concerns with an online survey
like ours: (1) not everybody is online, (2) not everybody online signs up for online surveys, (3) not
everybody who signs up for online surveys receives the survey, and (4) not everybody who receives
the survey takes it. We describe these issues in greater detail in Section II.E in Prescott et al. (2016).
All survey methods must confront issues (1), (3) and (4)—the only unique selection concern is (2).
The key question is why individuals sign up for online surveys in particular and whether that reason
is associated with the use of noncompetes.35 To understand why the individuals who responded to
our survey agreed to take online surveys, we asked them directly, and their responses were tabulated
in Table 13 of Prescott et al. (2016). The most common reasons individuals report for signing up to
take online surveys is that they like the rewards (59%) and sharing their opinion (58%). Only 40%
indicated they wanted money, and only 23% claimed they needed money. Taking these responses

33

Table A4 reports 15 randomly selected job titles, occupation duties, and industry.
See p.422 of Prescott et al. (2016) for details.
35
A look at the population of online survey takers (see Table 12 of Prescott et al. (2016)) shows that, relative to
the average labor force participant, they tend to be female and less likely to be in fulltime employment.
34
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seriously, the key selection question is, conditional on observables, whether individuals who like to
share their opinion or like the rewards are less likely to be in jobs that require noncompetes. We
believe it is certainly plausible that there is no such relationship.
A.5 Weighting and Imputation
In this section, we describe our approach to weighting and imputing data that is either
actually missing or was marked as missing during the cleaning process. The fact that weights need to
be included in the imputation process in order to impute unbiased population values complicates the
process. We proceeded by first weighting the nonmissing data, then imputing the missing variables
(including the weights), and finally reweighting given the imputed values so that the resulting dataset
is nationally representative.
We considered several weighting schemes,36 including post-stratification, iterative
proportional fitting (also called raking), and propensity score weighting. Details on these methods
can be found in Kalton and Flores-Cervantes (2003). For each method, we considered a variety of
potential weighting variables, and we examined the ability of each scheme to match variable
distributions in the 2014 ACS (see Table 17 in Prescott et al. (2016).). Iterative proportional fitting,
or raking, performs best in matching the distribution of key variables in the ACS.
Using raking weights, we sought to impute multiple variables (see Table 18 in Prescott et al.
(2016) for details). Some of these variables have missing values because of the cleaning process we
describe above; others have missing values because the question generating the variable was added to
the survey while the survey was in the field. In addition, as we describe in the paper, we also impute
whether the “maybes” have currently or ever signed a noncompete. Because we impute multiple
variables, we use Stata’s chained multiple imputation command, which imputes all variables in one

36

See p.436–46 in Prescott et al. (2016) for more details.
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step. As suggested in Sterne et al. (2009), we incorporate all the variables we use in our empirical
analyses into the imputation model, which would otherwise result in attenuated estimates. A single
imputation will generate unbiased coefficients, but the standard errors will be too small because the
predicted value will not capture estimate uncertainty (King et al. 2001). To obtain correct standard
errors, Graham et al. (2007) suggest carrying out at least 20 imputations when the proportion missing
is 30%. We add another 5 for good measure.
The exact mechanics of a given imputation step are as follows: First, we fit a regression
model using our nonmissing data. Second, we simulate new coefficients based on the posterior
distribution of the coefficients and standard errors (this step is what gives us variation across the 25
datasets). Third, we apply these coefficients to the observed covariates of the missing observations
and generate predicted values. For continuous variables, we use predictive mean matching in the
third step in which we take the average of the 15 nearest neighbors from the predicted value. For
binary variables, we use a logit model to create the predicted value. We repeat this process 25 times
for all missing values to be imputed. Once we have the 25 imputed datasets, we re-weight within
each dataset using the raking procedure we describe above, so that each individual dataset is
nationally representative.
Estimation via multiple imputation involves running the regression model on each individual
dataset, and then aggregating the 25 different estimates using Rubin’s rules, correcting the standard
errors for the variation both within and across imputations. Note that standard regression statistics,
like the R-squared, are not typically reported in analyses relying on multiply imputed data because
there are 25 estimates of R-squared. We report the mean of these estimates.
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